This paper provides research on the theme of the political budget cycles. The goal is to fi nd out whether or not the government tries to manipulate the state budget and its components for the purpose of reelection across the countries of the European Union. In order to verify this theory a dynamic panel data model was used. The results were signifi cant, but only if predetermined elections were not counted into the estimations. In that case, the theory of the political budget cycles could be accepted as valid for the EU countries. The main driving force of the political budget cycles across the countries of the European Union is fl uctuation of the government expenditures. During the election year, the government expenditures are higher, and a year a er the election, government expenditures are lower. This is refl ected into the state budget balance.
INTRODUCTION
The research of political budget cycle began several years ago. To describe this concept, I need to go back to the baseline of political business cycle problematic. The political business cycle is described as a part of government failure. The government tries to manipulate the economy to attain its goal, regardless of the real economic situation. Government's main goal is reelection. In order to be reelected, the government tries to enforce expansionary fi scal policy right before the election. Consequently, they have to implement restrictive fi scal policy a er re-election in order to prevent the impacts of this policy.
One of the fi rst publications on this subject was presented by William D. Nordhaus (1975) . He used trade-off between unemployment and infl ation. Douglas A. Hibbs (1977) expanded this problematic on various ideologies of political party. Since then, many papers have been based on these ideas. Rogoff and Sibert (1998) and Alesina (1987) have also a major contribution to the development of political business cycle using rational expectations.
With continuing research of the political business cycle, two important questions which reveal its weakness have arisen. Question number one -Is the government able to manipulate with real economy and if so to which extent? Second -Is it possible that the incumbent is able to time the fi scal expansion so that its impacts occur just before the election and not a er? The uncertainties about effi ciency of the fi scal policy on the real economy and diffi culties with the right timing of such a policy led to a change in the research. The main focus of economists has shi ed from the political business cycle to the political budget cycle. One of the fi rst economists who mentioned this problematic in his article was Kenneth Rogoff (1990) . He pointed out that the results of the political business cycle research have been mixed and therefore he has suggested focusing on research of the political budget cycle. He emphasized the importance of the signaling eff ect. This means that at the time of election, the incumbent signals his competence through the fi scal policy. Voters are naïve, and they want to elect more competent politicians. A consequence of this policy is a greater defi cit during the election year. The fact that the government could use state budget as an instrument for purpose of reelection brings more reliable studies.
A new angle on this problematic is shown in a paper by Shi and Svensson (2002) focusing on moral hazard approach to political budget cycle. In the paper, they concentrate on the diff erences between developed and developing countries and they try to explain them using the moral hazard model. Adi Brender and Allan Drazen (2004) made similar research and as well as Shi and Svensson (2002) , they assign these diff erences to a moral hazard. However, they also argue that voters rather punish politicians than reward for fi scal manipulation. Research by Jeroen Klomp and Jakob de Haan (2012) concentrates on distinction between political budget cycle "old" democracies and "new" democracies.
The goal of this paper is to fi nd out whether or not the government tries to manipulate the state budget and its components for the purpose of re-election across the countries of the European Union.
The political budget cycle falls under the theory of government failure. This means that government is imperfect. The EU member states are considered developed and highly democratic, and their fi scal politics should be transparent and credible. Voters should be rational and well informed about policy makers and their competences. However, even in these countries, we sometimes see voters who can be easily manipulated of fooled by politicians. The question is if it happens on a regular basis.
If we only take the theoretical assumption that the European Union's next step of integration is fi scal union, then the problem of the political budget cycle could be shared by all the EU countries. That could lead to a very unstable political environment on a multinational level. Therefore, politicians should practice such a policy which is corresponding with the real economic situation. Manipulation with the budget or with the economy for the profi t of politicians should be punished to help alleviate the problem of moral hazard.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Methodology of political budget cycle is presented in this section. I used a standard dynamic panel model for this purpose. My inspiration for this model was taken from work by Shi and Svensson (2002) . Specifi cations of the model could be described as follow: Arellano and Bond (1991) . GMM estimator was further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) , Ahn and Schmidt (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Estimations done by GMM are based on fi rst diff erence of equation, therefore equation (1) needs to be transferred as follows:
where f i,t = f i,t − f i,t−1 and the same principle is applied for all the variables. It is necessary for GMM estimation to fi nd valid instruments which are not correlated with fi rst diff erenced error term  i,t in all period (Baltagi, 2008) . Another possibility of approaching this problematic could be using a model with fi xed eff ects according to the Hausman test, but this approach could lead to bias in estimation. Annual data of variables from 1995 to 2014 are used for the estimation. In a sample are included member countries of the European Union. Unfortunately, I had to remove several countries due to the lack of data. It was Greece, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania, and Croatia. Ultimately, I was using a sample of 23 EU countries with a length of 20 periods.
Fiscal variables involve the state budget as a share of GDP, revenues as a share of GDP, and expenditures as a share of GDP. All these variables are available and easily accessible through Eurostat. Vector of control variables include GDP growth, GDP per capita, and the corruption perceptions index (CPI). The corruption perceptions index is taken from Transparency International, while GDP per capita and GDP growth are sourced from Eurostat. Election dummy variables are based on the election term of each country. The source of the election terms used is the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In this paper, the election variables are divided into two groups. The fi rst group of election variables is created based on every government election in each country 1 . The second group of election variables contains only elections which were held in a regular term. This type of dummies ends with the letter R 2 . Exact specifi cations of the election dummy variables are shown in Tab. I.
According to Tab. I, one can observe that the election dummy variable called AELE or AELER is set up to register reaction of the government a er the election. Variables ELE (ELER) and BELE (BELER) then record reactions of the government before the election.
RESULTS
Before presenting results of the research, it is necessary to defi ne a hypothesis of the regression coeffi cients of the election dummy variables. To confi rm the theory of political budget cycle, it is assumed that before the elections government revenues will decrease and expenditures will increase. Therefore, government's budget defi cit will grow. A er the election the government will have to face consequences of the reckless policy and the new incumbent will have to implement restrictive fi scal policy. Thus, we should see tendency towards increasing of government revenues and decreasing government expenditures a er the election. The government defi cit should fall. Exact expectations of the election variables are shown in Tab. II.
Exact results of the estimations are included in Tab. III for every election and in the Tab. IV for only regular election. How was said in a methodology part generalized method of moments (GMM) was used like an estimation method. For both type of the election (normal and regular) were estimated 9 diff erent equations. First we take a look at results included every elections (see Tab. III) .
Based on the estimation results, we can say that none of the election dummy variables is signifi cant at 5% level of signifi cance except for AELE in an equation with dependent variable expenditures. More specifi cally for the fi rst three equations with dependent variable budget, the hypotheses for variables ELE, AELE and BELE could not be confi rmed. Therefore, according to these estimations, the budget balance is not aff ected by an election terms. That means it is not aff ected either before or a er the elections. The same results are valid for equations with the dependent variable revenues. For equations with dependent variable expenditures variables ELE and BELE are rather insignifi cant but variable AELE is signifi cant at 5% level of signifi cance. The results incline to the conclusion that the government expenditures are not aff ected by elections before the elections themselves, however, results show signifi cant infl uence of elections on expenditures a er the elections (almost half percent).
If we take a look at all control variables (see Tab. III), it is possible to say that GDP grow is highly signifi cant (1% level) for equations with dependent variable budget and expenditures, but it is not valid for estimations with dependent variable revenues. All other control variables are insignifi cant at 5% level for all estimated equations. Variable CPI is signifi cant only at 10% level and only in two equations with dependent variable budget.
If we look at the results of estimations for only regular terms of the elections (see Tab. IV), we can see that the same equations were used but the election dummies were diff erent. Instead of ELE, AELE, BELE; ELER, AELER and BELER were used.
New estimations brought diff erent results. In case of government revenues, the results are the same as in estimations for every election included. All the election variables are insignifi cant. Therefore, government revenues are not aff ected by term of election not before, nor a er the elections. 
II: Expected hypothesis of regression coeffi cients of the election dummy variables

Dependent variables
Budget Revenues Expenditures ELE (ELER) − (−) − (−) + (+)
AELE (ALER) + (+) + (+) − (−)
BELE (BELER) − (−) − (−) + (+)
Note: Symbols in the Note: *** -signifi cant variable at the 1% level of signifi cance, ** -signifi cant variable at the 5% level of signifi cance, * -signifi cant variable at the 10% level of signifi cance. J-statistic imply that model is not over-identify. Source: Eviews -own processing 3 In case of BELER, there is evidence of increasing budget defi cit during election year and in same case (when the elections occurred in fi rst three months of the year) before election year. 4 Estimations with election dummy variables which contain every occurred election.
DISCUSSION
Earlier in this paper, results of the estimations were presented. Evaluations of these results bring three interesting facts.
First, only one of the control variables was signifi cant 5 . Therefore, budget balance, government expenditures and government revenues are not aff ected by GDP per capita, rate of unemployment, nor corruption perceptions index. Naturally, GDP growth has had an important infl uence on the budget balance but only with relation to government expenditures. That is surely an unexpected result.
IV: Estimation results for equation (2) -including only regular elections
Dependent Variables
Budget
Revenues Expenditures Note: *** -signifi cant variable at 1% level of signifi cance, ** -signifi cant variable at 5% level of signifi cance, * -signifi cant variable at 10% level of signifi cance. Source: Own processing One could anticipate that government revenues, which consist mainly of taxes and social security payments, should be aff ected by growth of GDP. However, this problematic is not to be discussed in this paper. Rather, let's look at government revenues which do not seem to be aff ected by anything at all, not even election terms. The latter statement is valid for every election, as well as for only regular elections. The second fact is that if the election variables are counted from every past election, then there can be shown only one important result. This result concerns the post-election period. Governments reduce their expenditures immediately in year a er the election. This is partly refl ected into the budget balance although the variable confi rmatory this statement is signifi cant only at 10% of signifi cance. In short, the results show that governments across the EU countries react to elections only in a way that a er the election they reduce expenditures. Therefore, they use their political capital. No other results could be confi rmed.
Finally, the results were drastically changed when only regular elections were counted so that the election variables did not include early elections. This means that governments had time and space for the implication of their intentions. In this case, not only post-election infl uence but also pre-election infl uence was evident. According to the estimated results, one can state that governments across the EU countries use budget balance as an instrument to attain their goals. It is essential to remember that the main goal of every government is reelection. It is important to note, that political budget cycles are induced by government expenditures. With relation to revenues, no infl uence caused by the election was confi rmed. In their work, Brender and Drazen (2004) reached a similar conclusion that political budget cycles are caused by higher expenditures during election year. In their case, it was valid mainly for new democracies 6 . The same conclusion could be found in the work of Jeroen Klomp and Jakob de Haan (2012) , who tested political budget cycles in 65 democratic countries all around the world. They also pointed out that political budget cycles are more evident in young democracies.
On the other hand, the results of this paper clearly show that political budget cycles are evident even for developed countries, which countries of Western Europe certainly are. This conclusion is in contrast with Brender and Drazen (2004) , however, the work of Georgios E hyvoulou (2010) confi rmed this conclusion completely. His work was also focused on political budget cycles across the countries of the European Union but only from 1997 to 2008. His results indicate same conclusions as in this paper.
The deeper analysis of the causalities with relation to government expenditures could be more interesting for future research of political budget cycles. For instance, what parts of the government expenditures are the most aff ected by the elections? Additionally, can normal voters distinguish between changes in government expenditures for the purpose of re-election from the purpose of real needs of the single economy? These could be two questions referring to further research. Also, it would be interesting if one could put this problematic in contrast with the transparency of the governments. Thus, based on suggestions of Brender and Drazen (2004) , and Shi and Svensson (2002) , one can test institutional factors of political budget cycles.
